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Abstract 
After the Golden Age, Italy experienced increasing difficulties in adjusting its economy to 
the changing external context and to the requirements for sustaining catch-up growth at a 
higher level of economic development. The adjustment issue is common to advanced 
countries but the difficulties experienced in Italy look particularly severe. Cushioned by 
inflation and devaluation, growth remained relatively high in the 1970s. In the subsequent 
decade, in spite of improved conditions for addressing macroeconomic disequilibria 
structural adjustments were neglected. Major supply side reforms were eventually 
implemented in the aftermath of the 1992 crisis. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 
decade growth fell below the EU average. These necessary reforms fell however short of 
what was required. Participation in EMU did not help as far as the improvement of growth 
prospects was concerned. In the last section some of the economic and meta-economic 
factors explaining the ineffectiveness of the reform process are briefly explored. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to describe and explain Italy‟s growth performance in the period since 
World War II. We develop an interpretation of catch-up growth from an initial position 
where the level of per capita income was well below that of the leading economies and then 
explore the experience of recent decades where the issue becomes one of further 
modernization to maintain a strong position among the elite. Economic policy decisions, in 
particular those made in response to challenges emerging from the external economic 
environment, have played a major role in determining productivity performance through 
their impact on the quantity and quality of investment and innovation, and an evaluation of 
their part in growth outcomes is our central concern. 
An important starting point for our analysis is the proposition that the process of catch-up 
growth typically entails a series of ongoing reforms with the danger that at some point the 
political economy of the next step in modernization becomes too difficult. As modern 
growth economics stresses (Aghion and Howitt 2006), the institutions and policy choices 
that can galvanize a far-from-frontier economy differ in many ways from what is appropriate 
for a close-to-frontier economy. In particular, in the latter case stronger competition in 
product markets and high-quality education become more important. Similarly, as new 
technologies come along, institutions and policies may need to be reformed. Yet, making the 
requisite adjustments may be problematic and achieved only slowly and incompletely such 
that catch-up growth falters. The constraints of the historical legacy are important in this 
context. 
The international economic environment affects growth performance in several important 
ways although its impact will depend upon the details of the domestic policy response and 
interactions with domestic institutions. It follows that each country‟s performance will have 
a common component based on external circumstances and an individual component based 
on its own distinctive behaviour shaped by history and politics, even though ideas as to what 
is „best-practice‟ policy are strongly correlated across the OECD countries. 
Key aspects of developments in the world economy most obviously include high-profile 
shocks to aggregate supply (such as oil-price rises) and to aggregate demand (for example, 
financial crises). Dealing with these macroeconomic disturbances can entail policy choices 
with long-term supply-side consequences. In turn, the extent of policy discretion depends on 
the international economic architecture of monetary arrangements, treaty obligations etc. 
which influence the prospects for export-led growth and the extent of globalization. As 
globalization proceeds, changes in the international division of labour imply the need for 
structural change and this places a premium on flexibility in domestic markets. Finally, 
technological change, which overwhelmingly comes from other countries‟ R & D, provides 
opportunities for faster growth but exploiting them well may depend on policy reform. 
Across the world, the diffusion of, and convergence in, the use of technology has speeded up 
and has been about three times as rapid post-1950 compared with pre-1925 (Comin et al. 
2006). 
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The international economic environment with which the Italian economy interacts has been 
transformed in the last sixty years. The general trajectory has been towards globalization, 
i.e., the greater economic integration of capital and product markets especially within Europe 
but also across the world as a whole, starting from a position of very low capital mobility 
and trade protectionism following the disruptions of the Great Depression and World War II. 
Tables 1 and 2 reflect these trends. 
Table 1 shows a big decline in trade costs during the postwar period; these trends are 
dominated by reductions in protectionist barriers rather than declines in transport costs. This 
is apparent from the variations for Italian trade with different partners which reveal that 
European integration has been the most powerful influence on trade costs. The EEC 
stimulated both „juggernaut‟ and „domino‟ effects which consolidated the original trade 
agreement through increasing the weight of business favouring further liberalization and 
encouraging both enlargement and multilateral tariff reductions (Baldwin 2006). 
Table 2 reflects the very low level of international capital mobility in the early postwar 
period when OECD countries, including Italy, generally controlled capital movements very 
tightly while making their macroeconomic trilemma choice for a combination of 
independent monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate under the auspices of the Bretton 
Woods international monetary system (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). From the 1980s, the 
globalization of capital markets accelerated sharply and Italy moved to full capital-account 
liberalization by the 1990s, a very different policy stance compared with the early 1950s. 
After World War II, growth of world trade by volume was very strong; it outstripped world 
GDP growth and averaged 7.9 per cent during 1950-1973 (WTO 2008) even though the 
world average decline in trade costs was only about 2 per cent prior to 1970 in a period when 
trade liberalization mainly concerned OECD manufacturing. From 1973 to the eve of the 
current crisis, world trade growth slowed to 4.8 per cent per year but was still much faster 
than GDP growth. A striking feature of these years was the emergence of a new international 
division of labour in which Asian countries became much more important as exporters of 
manufactures while the shares of Europe and North America contracted sharply (Table 3). 
This reflected Asian success in putting in place policies and institutions that promoted rapid 
catch-up growth, first in Japan, then in the Asian Tigers followed by China and India (Table 
4). Adjustments to this new exporting prowess were required, especially of those countries 
like Italy where revealed comparative advantage was positively correlated with that of 
dynamic Asia (Rae and Sollie 2007). 
Table 4 reports that the period from the early 1950s to the first OPEC oil shock, the so-called 
Golden Age of European growth, was one where the world economy as a whole grew fast. 
These were the years of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates and, quite 
unlike the interwar period, an era when OECD countries were largely free from financial 
crises and macroeconomic turbulence (Bordo 1993). It was an ideal opportunity for countries 
with undervalued exchange rates, faced with buoyant export demand, to industrialize and 
catch up (Boltho 1996). Conversely, the stagflation of the 1970s, driven by adverse 
aggregate supply shocks, was an environment that posed great challenges for 
macroeconomic policymakers who faced difficult trade-offs between objectives. For many 
European countries, including Italy, the policy framework that eventually emerged was a 
trajectory towards a single currency via the European Monetary System of the 1980s and 
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1990s. This was an era of slower macroeconomic growth but, after the 1980s, a combination 
of good luck in terms of the absence of adverse shocks and the adoption of inflation-
targeting policies produced macroeconomic stability, the so-called Great Moderation (Stock 
and Watson 2005). 
Fast European growth in the 1950s and 1960s was based on policies and institutions which 
facilitated high rates of investment and the diffusion of American technology in the era of 
Fordist manufacturing. Broadly speaking, this was a period where, to use the terminology of 
Hall and Soskice (2001), „co-ordinated market economies‟ prospered. This was generally a 
period of greater government intervention in terms of regulation, state ownership and 
industrial policy. In later decades, growth opportunities centred more on the services sector 
and the diffusion of information and communications technologies (ICT). This seems to 
have been an era which placed a greater premium on flexible adjustment in labour and 
product markets and on intangible capital accumulation rather than on massive investment in 
physical capital (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Timmer et al. 2010). In this era, the „liberal 
market economies‟ were better placed. However, as ideas of „best practice‟ in 
microeconomic policy changed, there was a general change of emphasis among OECD 
countries towards competition and privatization policies.  
To a considerable extent, Italy has shared in these general European trends. At the same 
time, it is clear that in some respects the Italian experience differs. With regard to 
institutions, as Hall and Soskice (2001) note, Italy has represented an „ambiguous case‟, 
neither CME (German-style) bank-based nor an LME (American-style). Concerning policy 
responses, the Italian approach to coping with the stagflationary shocks of the 1970s resulted 
in a relatively high inflation economy and led to the build-up of a high ratio of public debt to 
GDP in the 1980s. (Fig.1) Obviously, the question of economic performance in the South 
marks out Italy as a special case. In terms of growth outcomes, the key feature is that, as a 
far-from-frontier economy in the age of Fordist manufacturing, Italy outperformed during 
the Golden Age but, as a close-to-frontier economy in the ICT era, Italy has disappointed 
over the last twenty years. 
This highlights the general question of whether Italy was more in need of policy reform than 
its European peer group after the Golden Age or whether policy reforms were implemented 
more slowly or less successfully. And, in turn, this raises a number of other issues which are 
explored in what follows. These include evaluating the pluses and minuses of the „postwar 
settlement‟ both in the short and the long run, reviewing supply-side policies relevant to the 
considering the implications of the decisions that Italy made with regard to the European 
integration agenda, and the possible reasons for the difficulties of implementing structural 
reforms, in particular after the Golden Age. 
We end our analysis in 2007 on the eve of the crisis which we do not explicitly consider. In 
so far as Italy‟s difficulties during the present travails of the Eurozone have been exacerbated 
by inadequate public-finance and supply-side reforms our discussion of Italy‟s economic 
history provides some context for, although not an analysis of, these problems.  
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2. Italy in the Golden Age 
It has become conventional in comparative studies of European economic growth to consider 
the period 1950-73 as the „Golden Age‟. This was a period of β-convergence in which 
European countries generally experienced rapid catch-up growth based on technology 
transfer and structural change and growth rates were inversely correlated with initial income 
levels. The basis of catch-up varied over time; initially, postwar reconstruction and reduction 
in the size of agriculture the agricultural sector played a part but, in general, by the later 
1960s reductions in technology gaps were the main source (Temin 2002).  
During the Golden Age, Italy enjoyed growth of real GDP per person at almost 5 per cent 
per year, as Table 5 reports. This largely reflects the relatively large scope for catch-up 
reflected in the low initial income level in 1950. However, normalizing for initial income, 
Italy outperformed its European peer group and growth was about 0.65 percentage points per 
year faster than might have been expected (Crafts and Toniolo 2008). Labour productivity 
growth averaged 6.8 per cent per year in industry and 5.7 per cent per year in agriculture 
during these years (Broadberry et al. 2010). The weight of agriculture in the economy fell 
rapidly; the sector accounted for 44 per cent of employment in 1951 but only 18 per cent in 
1973. 
Italy enjoyed a remarkably rapid rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth at this time; 
from 1945 to 1973 the average was 5.8 per cent per year (Broadberry et al. 2010). As catch-
up proceeded from a starting point of „backwardness‟, in part, TFP growth came from 
reductions in inefficiency, especially resulting from the movement of labour out of 
agriculture, as Table 6 reports, and from the realization of substantial economies of scale 
(Rossi and Toniolo 1996). In part, TFP growth reflected successful technology transfer 
together with creative adaptation and localized learning at which Italy excelled (Antonelli 
and Barbiellini-Amidei 2009) even though the country did not have a national innovation 
system that exhibited high levels of R & D or rates of patenting. In the 1960s, Italy spent 
only about 0.6 per cent GDP on R & D (about 1/3 the West German level), and in 1973 
obtained only 3.4 per cent of the foreign patents in the United States compared with a West 
German share of 24.2 per cent (Verspagen 1996; Pavitt and Soete 1982). 
Human capital was on the whole favourable. While average years of schooling were low, 4.8 
years in 1950 rising to 6.8 in 1970 (Morrisson and Murtin 2009), human capital was, 
however, suited to incrementally adapt the imported technologies which constituted the main 
channel of innovation. In comparative terms, Italy benefited from the high number of good 
engineers, who played an essential role in designing the organization of the productive 
processes in large firms. This expertise was inherited and further developed largely by public 
firms which were the main promoters of the convergence of the Italian industrial structure 
towards that prevailing in Europe (De Nardis and Traù 2005; Barca and Trento 1997). This 
evolution paralleled and complemented the earliest stages of the process driven by 
small‐medium firms, often forming industrial districts specialized in traditional products, 
which accelerated dramatically later in the Seventies. The convergence process of the 
Golden Age was, however, incomplete: high‐technology sectors were less well developed 
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than in the other major European economies, as is reflected in the trade performance data 
reported in Federico and Wolf (2010). 
Clearly, moving to a trajectory of rapid catch-up growth was not automatic but required an 
appropriate institutional and policy framework, „social capability‟ in the well-known 
terminology of Abramovitz (1986). In this regard, a key ingredient in Western Europe was 
the „postwar settlement‟ which for most countries was reached in the context of the Marshall 
Plan.  
It is not entirely clear how much difference the Marshall Plan made to early postwar Italy. It 
is unlikely that growth was much affected by the direct economic effects of the $1.5 billion 
which Italy received from the United States in the years 1948 to 1951, amounting to 2per 
cent of GDP compared with an average of 2.5 per cent for all countries (Eichengreen and 
Uzan 1992), but it may have been an important factor in deciding the distribution of the costs 
of stabilization, in supporting the modernization of industrial plants, especially in the 
electrical, steel and metals sectors (Fauri 2010), and in heading off a possible „war of 
attrition‟ (Casella and Eichengreen 1994). It also added impetus to the move towards trade 
liberalization and the European Payments Union. 
The main features of the postwar settlement in Italy were an early stabilization in 1947, a 
political constitution that embodied checks and balances, the isolation of a strong 
Communist Party, the progressive opening to international competition, and participation in 
the Bretton Woods system. Italy was at the forefront of the European integration process, 
moved relatively quickly to reduce barriers to international trade and joined the Bretton-
Woods system at an undervalued parity.
1
 These decisions were, of course, strongly 
influenced by the positioning of Italy in the Western bloc led by the US. At the same time, 
they were seen by the leading economic authorities (notably by Luigi Einaudi, the Governor 
of the Bank of Italy and, in 1947, Minister of the Budget) as useful steps in order to foster 
competition and to weaken the industrial oligopolistic groups.  
However, unlike what happened in the United Kingdom in 1948 and later in Germany where  
competition authorities were created,  on the domestic front this aim was not accompanied 
by corresponding attempts to implement competition policies; corporate governance 
structures remained closed, sectors sheltered from international competition (retail, 
professional orders, public utilities)  highly regulated.  
The domestic policy stance reflected the heterogeneous nature of the main political forces 
and interest groups. “Free market” supporters were in a minority – because of the prevailing 
ideological climate in Europe after the war and because of the Italian historical legacy – and 
had to face not only the isolated but socially influential communist and socialist opposition 
but also the hostility of an important component of the ruling party (the catholic Democrazia 
cristiana) which favoured an active role for the State in the economy. A similar confidence in 
the necessity of public  intervention in promoting accumulation and a corresponding mistrust 
in the capacity of private groups of accomplishing this task shaped the ideas of the leading 
managers of the State-owned enterprises (IRI), among them Donato Menichella, general 
                                                          
1
 The parity of the lira was set at 625 per US dollar at the end of 1949. The US proposal of a more devalued 
parity was successfully resisted by the Italian government (Asso, Biagioli and Picozza 1995). 
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director of IRI in 1933-1944 and Governor of the Bank of Italy from 1948 to 1960. In fact, a 
distinctive feature of the postwar settlement was the preservation of the unusually large role 
played by firms and banks controlled by the State, but operating as private profit oriented 
autonomous entities, created in 1933 following the collapse of the big private financial and 
industrial groups. It was mainly the political acumen of the Prime Minister and leader of the 
Democrazia Cristiana, Alcide De Gasperi, that enabled a balance to be struck between these 
different forces, and between them and the interests of the private industrial firms.  
After World War II, for the first time in Italian history, the South – since 1861 the most 
prominent structural issue of the Italian economy (Iuzzolino, Pellegrini and Viesti 2011) –  
became the object of systematic specific policies. As a matter of fact, at the outset of the 
Golden Age, the South benefited very little from ERP funds (Fauri 2010; Del Monte and 
Giannola 1978). The promotion of growth in the South was not a priority of the policy 
agenda (Cafiero 1996). However, two factors rapidly changed this picture. First, the acute 
social tensions in the huge Southern agricultural sector, largely based on large estates, 
greatly endangered political stability and therefore the integration of Italy in the Western 
bloc. Second, the influence and the quality of the IRI management which survived the end of 
fascism was a fundamental element in promoting a specific policy aimed at the reduction of 
the North-South gap. This policy, “l‟intervento straordinario”  (special development policy) 
was based on the principle of additionality with respect to “ordinary” policy (i.e., was 
targeted specifically at the backward areas and was therefore “extra” with respect to 
“ordinary” capital expenditure), and was conceived as a decisive part of Italian economic 
policy as a whole. It was animated by the belief that the closure of the income gap, far from 
being the long period outcome of market forces – as mainstream economist thought had 
maintained – had to be achieved by policy means. The growth of the South and of Italy was 
seen as one thing: this was the central idea animating the promoters of the special 
development policy and later of the structural-reform policy (programmazione) during the 
centre-left governments at the beginning of the 1960s (La Malfa 1962).  
The main instrument of the special development policy, the “Cassa del Mezzogiorno”, 
turned out to be a body independent from the Public Administration. 
2
 The autonomy from 
ordinary Public Administration was a feature of Italian economic policy in the Golden Age, 
not just regional policy. Not by chance, the most successful period of the Cassa coincided 
with this period. Between 1951 and 1973, the North-South gap in terms of GDP per head 
experienced a strong reduction for the first and only time in history.  
In the Golden Age, the South had positive effects on the growth of the rest of Italy. Low-
skilled and cheap labour, particularly suitable for the Fordist mode of production, poured 
from the Southern agricultural sector into the Northern plants. Especially prior to the 
creation of the European Common Market, the growing market in the South increased 
demand for Northern products. At the end of the 1950s, 70 per cent of net exports of the 
Center-North were directed towards the South. The growth of the domestic market allowed 
economies of scale to be realized in Northern firms (Iuzzolino, Pellegrini and Viesti 2011.)   
                                                          
2
 In the first years it was subject to the supervision of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development which heavily financed the start - up of the “Cassa.”  
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Trade liberalization was an important factor in Western Europe‟s Golden Age. Between the 
late 1950s and early 1970s, it raised the average growth rate by about 1 per cent per year 
(Badinger 2005). Countries which were slow to liberalize such as Spain and Ireland paid a 
price in terms of slower growth. In the Italian case, the move to greater openness facilitated a 
process of export-led growth as Italy‟s share of world manufactured exports rose from 3.7 
per cent in 1950 to 6.8 per cent in 1973. The real exchange rate was kept low by the 
tendency for real wages to grow only a little faster than labour productivity in the context of 
an elastic supply of labour to manufacturing industries.
3
 The consequent expansion of the 
tradeables sector raised its productivity through internal and external economies of scale; 
according to some estimates, undervaluation of 20 per cent on average during the 1950s and 
1960s may have raised the growth rate by perhaps 1 percentage point per year at this time 
(Di Nino et al. 2010). 
Eichengreen (1996) argued that catch-up growth in the European Golden Age was 
underpinned in many countries by a corporatist social contract which allowed a cooperative 
equilibrium in which wage restraint was rewarded by high investment which benefited both 
firms and their workers in the long run. A cross-country regression suggests that until the 
mid-1970s coordinated wage bargaining does appear to have raised investment and growth 
rates quite appreciably (Gilmore 2009) but this was only to a very limited extent the case for 
Italy. Wage moderation in Italy lacked these institutional underpinnings and should rather be 
seen as a result of weak union bargaining power where, as Lewis (1954) might have put it, 
labour supply was „unlimited‟ as labour was re-deployed out of agriculture. But the high 
degree of political and ideological conflict (Salvati 2000), accompanied by the ruthless 
attitude of entrepreneurs keen to exploit their bargaining power, made this equilibrium 
potentially unstable. The first strike wave in the early 1960s and, to a much greater extent, 
the „hot autumn‟ of 1969 signalled the end of this phase. The subsequent instability of 
industrial relations confirms the absence of the institutions of a co-ordinated market 
economy. 
With regard to domestic supply-side policy, the postwar settlement was adequate for a 
process of rapid catch-up for a „backward‟ economy to be launched but, later on, as Italy got 
closer to the frontier, this was no longer the case. This is epitomized by a distinctive feature 
of Golden-Age Italy, namely, the state-owned enterprises IRI, augmented by ENI in the 
energy sector from 1953. Initially, public enterprises were a route to speeding up investment 
and were given high managerial autonomy that meant they could achieve economic 
efficiency. In particular, IRI helped the development of the private machinery industry by 
providing cheap intermediate inputs; compensating for the weakness of private firms in this 
field was important. By the 1960s, however, public enterprises were increasingly hi-jacked 
for political purposes (Barca et al. 1998; Woods 1998). This degenerative process also 
involved the banks owned by IRI. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s they allocated financial 
resources efficiently, in subsequent years they were hampered in selecting innovative firms 
by the growing influence of political networks.  
                                                          
3
 This was very much the case in the 1950s when for the industrial sector real wage and labour productivity 
grew at 5.36 per cent and 5.06 per cent, respectively; it was less so in the 1960s when real wage and labour 
productivity growth averaged 5.61 per cent and 4.45 per cent, respectively (Broadberry et al. 2010). 
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The postwar investment boom was largely financed from a high share of profits in national 
income. Italy possessed neither a CME bank-based nor an LME equity-based financial 
system but one in which corporate governance was largely based on family-controlled 
pyramidal groups, state-owned large firms and banks which were themselves very largely 
under state control (Pagano and Trento 2003). By the end of the Golden Age, as profits came 
under pressure, this resulted in major problems for the operation and financing of large firms 
(De Cecco and Ferri 2001).  
The peak of the Golden Age was reached in 1958-1963 with the culmination of the 
„economic miracle‟ that had turned Italy into an industrial economy, but there were emerging 
tensions that threatened instability, notably the potential conflict between sustaining growth 
on the basis of low wages and demands for higher consumption resulting from the successful 
economic development. 
In 1963, at the end of the “economic miracle”, monetary policy suddenly turned restrictive in 
the face of mounting balance of payments disequilibria and inflation pressures. These latter 
were driven by the first significant wage push in fifty years, in the context of the abatement 
of unemployment and a resurgence of union militancy. The policy reaction was successful in 
stopping wage increases and in avoiding a much feared devaluation and the economy 
managed to return to an equilibrium (albeit slower) growth path until the beginning of the 
next decade.  
In retrospect, 1963 is also noteworthy because of new aspects of the design of economic 
policy similar in some ways to those emerging elsewhere in Europe. In many countries some 
sort of vaguely Keynesian‐inspired income policies were attempted during the sixties (e.g., 
France, Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom). However, the most ambitious attempt was 
put forward in Italy, when the socialist party, previously under the communist influence, 
entered the government in 1963, forming a centre‐left coalition. Since the economy had 
grown at incredibly high rates in the previous years, the general assumption was that this 
speed could easily be maintained and that the main task left for economic policy was to 
direct the resources produced by growth to favoured objectives. In order to achieve this 
result a macroeconomic programme (programmazione) was designed in order to tackle the 
main structural problems of the economy, namely, the North‐South gap, welfare, anti‐trust 
regulation and company-law reform. Incomes policy would ensure the sustainability of 
growth by preserving competitiveness and by keeping inflationary pressures under control. 
With the programmazione there was also an attempt to render industrial relations less 
adversarial by involving unions in discussions about the compatibility of wage dynamics 
with macroeconomic objectives and to pave the way for a coordinated market economy.  
On the whole, the programme was heavily influenced by a dirigiste approach not uncommon 
in the European economic culture of the time. But, somehow paradoxically, this was also 
due to the intellectual contribution to the programmazione of the “liberal-socialisti”, a small 
but very active group in the second half of the Fifties, aimed at introducing competition on 
the product and service markets, in particular in the public utilities, and at opening the 
structures of corporate governance of private firms. Both anticipated central themes of the 
policy debate decades later. At that time, the latter was successfully countered by the 
employers‟ organisation. The competition issue was tackled by the proposal to dismantle the 
existing monopolies not by ensuring a proper competition-promoting regulation of the 
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market but by nationalization of entire sectors. Whereas the case of failure of the market was 
acknowledged, the case of failure of the State was still to be taken into consideration.   
The policy reform proved unrealistic, however, for a number of reasons. On the 
macroeconomic side, the momentum of growth gradually decreased. On the whole, firms 
encountered significant difficulties in speeding up innovation to compensate for the waning 
of the catch-up model based on „unlimited‟ labour supply and on technological transfer. The 
growth of fixed investment, mainly aimed at implementing labour saving technologies, 
slowed down from 11 per cent on a yearly average in 1958-1963 to 5 per cent in 1964-1973. 
Current account surpluses (2 per cent of GDP on average at this time) were matched by 
capital outflows surging to $1 billion annually (Biagioli 1995) The first, by changing relative 
factor intensity, reflected the aim of containing the squeeze of profits due to the wage 
increases of 1961-1963; the second was the result not only of the search for financial 
instruments still unavailable on the Italian market but also to a considerable extent of an 
emerging fear of left-oriented policy measures.    
The reform design dragged on during the entire decade and was never implemented. Incomes 
policy proposals ran up against the weakness of the reform culture of the communist 
opposition (Magnani 1997b), the targets set by the programmazione were not compatible 
with the inefficiency of public administration, the anti-trust regulation and company-law 
reform proposals were defeated by the consolidated interests of the large industrial groups 
(Barca 1997a; Ciocca 2007). Moreover, the ambition of the State to guide the market in 
strategic directions turned into a radical reduction of the autonomy of economic leaders, 
more and more subordinated to the greed of political lobbies and parties. The progressive 
contribution of state‐controlled enterprises came gradually to an end, accentuating the 1970s 
crisis of large firms in the steel, energy and chemicals sectors which had led the convergence 
of the Italian industrial structure during the Golden Age.  
The hot autumn of 1969 marked the clear failure of the incomes-policy approach advanced 
by the centre-left governments. Within a few years, the Italian economy went through a huge 
and persistent wage shock and through the oil shock. The macroeconomic context for reform 
worsened rapidly. Also, the development policy suffered clear setbacks at the end of the 
Sixties. The abolition of regionally-differentiated wage structures in national contracts raised 
relative Southern labour costs and reduced wage flexibility, although a partial compensation 
was found by charging employers‟ social-security contributions to the budget. Moreover, the 
construction of the first pillars of a modern national welfare state, in particular, in terms of 
pensions and health service, inevitably tended to reduce the amount of public resources 
available for the special development policy.  
Was economic policy well-designed to exploit the favourable conditions of the Golden Age?  
In principle, two episodes seem particularly relevant in answering this question, namely,   
the postwar settlement in 1946-48 and the centre-left turn in 1963. The former we take to be 
mainly a product of the political circumstances of the time. The growth model that resulted 
delivered extraordinary results up to the early 1960s, even by the standards of the time. At 
the beginning of the Sixties political constraints were less severe, growth had produced an 
unprecedented volume of resources. In spite of its contradictions, the turn of 1963, we 
believe, represents a missed opportunity for reforms that would have improved subsequent 
economic performance. 
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The failure in 1963 to adapt institutions, regulations and the scope of public intervention in 
the economy to the new circumstances created by growth (end of the unlimited supply of 
labour, congestion costs, formation of a significant working class in the North, resurgence of 
union militancy) may be thought of as a clear reflection of a long-standing feature of Italian 
economic policy, i.e., the weakness of the reform policy culture, squeezed between the 
“alternative to the system”, at that time cautiously but nonetheless firmly put forward by the 
main  opposition party on the one hand and the defence of diffused particular interests on the 
other.  
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3. From the 1970s to the 1990s 
After the early 1970s, growth slowed down quite markedly right across Europe, as Table 7 
reports. The end of the Golden Age had a number of unavoidable aspects including the 
exhaustion of transitory components of fast growth such as postwar reconstruction, reduced 
opportunities to redeploy labour out of agriculture, narrowing of the technology gap, and 
diminishing returns to investment. TFP growth slowed down markedly. Moreover, the 
United States itself experienced a productivity growth slowdown. All-in-all, the scope for 
catch-up growth was much reduced, although by no means eliminated. In addition, in the 
face of both internal labour militancy and external oil-price shocks together with the collapse 
of the discipline of the fixed exchange rate system macroeconomic policymaking became 
much more difficult. 
Indeed, from the end of the Golden Age, Western Europe‟s catch-up of the United States in 
terms of real GDP per person stalled. The European level was 68.3 per cent of the American 
level in 1973, 68.6 per cent in 1995 and 68.2 per cent in 2007. The picture in terms of labour 
productivity was different. Catch-up in terms of real GDP per hour worked continued until 
the mid-1990s and the European level rose from 63.3 per cent of the American level in 1973 
to 85.1 per cent in 1995 but then retreated to 76.5 per cent by 2007. From the 1970s to the 
mid-1990s the discrepancy comes from a decrease in the amount of work done by Europeans 
compared with Americans, accounted for by a combination of rising unemployment, earlier 
retirement and longer holidays. The implications for economic welfare depend on how far 
these outcomes result from differences in preferences or distortions to markets from 
regulations, taxes etc. This remains unclear (Faggio and Nickell 2007). 
Italy has had a similar experience but with some distinctive features; real GDP per person 
was 63.7 per cent of the level in the United States both in 1973 and in 2007 but had been 
higher at 69.9 per cent in 1995. The gap in labour productivity between Italy and the United 
States narrowed quite steadily between the end of the Golden Age and the mid-1990s but 
then widened appreciably; the ratio was 64.9 per cent in 1973, 81.8 per cent in 1995 and 67.6 
per cent in 2007. The idiosyncratic Italian aspects that are a cause for concern are low female 
employment and high levels of inactivity among males over 55. These aspects have been a 
persistent feature of recent decades and do, at least partly, reflect distortions. Together, 
inflexibilities in labour markets that deny part-time employment opportunities and relatively 
low education attainments account for most of the difference in female employment levels 
compared with the European average (Del Boca et al. 2004) while early retirement for men 
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has been heavily incentivized by the pension system and an astonishingly high implicit tax 
on working after the age of 60 (Duval 2003).
4
  
Although catch-up of the United States in terms of labour productivity continued, the rate of 
convergence slowed down (Crafts 2007). European countries struggled to cope with the 
aftermath of the macroeconomic turbulence of the 1970s, to embrace creative destruction in 
the context of the need to adjust to a changing world economy and to achieve rapid 
productivity growth in the increasingly dominant services sector. The Eichengreen wage-
moderation model broke down (Cameron and Wallace 2002; Gilmore 2009) while 
regulation, taxation and expenditure on social transfers increased. While these policy shifts 
were understandable in the context of the pressures of the time and the legacy of the social 
contracts of the earlier postwar period, they tended to slow growth down. Kneller et al. 
(1999) estimated that an increase of 1 percentage point in the ratio of distortionary taxes to 
GDP slowed growth by 0.1 percentage point. Employment protection impeded growth in 
sectors intensive in the use of human capital and more innovative sectors (Conti and Sulis 
2010). Product market regulation that inhibited competition slowed catch-up in TFP 
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005). Tables 8, 9, and 10 indicate that there was cause for concern. 
This account has resonance for Italy where the Golden-Age growth model had run out of 
steam. The service-sector now had a much increased weight and its performance became 
increasingly important. From 1973 to 1993, the share of employment in services rose from 
43.9 to 62.2 per cent while the share in industry fell from 38.4 to 31.3 per cent but service-
sector labour productivity growth averaged only 0.5 per cent per year during this period 
(Broadberry et al. 2010) and economy-wide TFP growth fell to 1.2 per cent per year.  
In fact, Italy was notable in this period for a very high level of employment protection (Table 
8), was slow to relax product-market regulation (Table 9) and hampered by regulatory 
procedures and costs, relatively high barriers to entry (Klapper et al. 2006, Bianco et al. 
2011). The estimates in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) suggest that slowness to deregulate 
product markets cost Italy about 0.7 percentage points per year in the 1980s and 1990s 
compared with adopting a stance similar to the most liberal OECD country while the 
estimates in Caballero et al. (2004) imply that employment protection slowed adjustment in 
Italy and has a labour productivity growth cost of about 0.3 percentage points per year in the 
period 1980 to 1998 compared with the economy with the least employment protection. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, several factors tended in Europe to reduce optimal firm size 
(minimum efficient scale): the crisis of the Fordist organization of labour due to the 
antagonistic attitude of workers in large firms and their demands for higher wages, the 
diversification and specialization of demand, technological innovations which made 
equipment capital more flexible, and reduced benefits of vertical integration of production. 
                                                          
4
 Gordon (2008) points out that state-sponsored early retirement has very high costs in terms of reduced 
consumption which are clearly much greater than any gain in terms of additional leisure time. 
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International competition was now based more on product innovations and less on 
standardized mass production, notably in automobiles (Bianchi 2002). 
These factors lay at the heart of the so called flexible-specialization model (Sabel 1982). 
Italian industry shared these general tendencies with particular intensity for two reasons. 
First, industrial structure was already characterized in the 1950s and 1960s by a relatively 
large share of small- and medium-size firms and by the prominence of industrial districts 
(Brusco and Paba 1997). Second, after the “hot autumn”, large firms reacted by de-
centralizing production because of rapidly increasing rigidities emerging in the production 
process at the shop-floor level.  
The emergence of new small- and medium-size enterprises was concentrated mostly in their 
historical locations in the Centre and the North, shaping a sort of “regionalized model of 
capitalism” based on agglomeration economies, on local networks and non-market 
mechanisms of coordination (Trigilia and Burroni 2009), as well as on the accumulation of 
tacit knowledge (Antonelli and Barbiellini-Amidei 2009). By contrast, the weakness of 
indigenous entrepreneurship – the main failure of the special development policy – 
prevented the growth of flexible small-medium size firms in the South. 
These latter (20-50 employees) were the main support of growth in industry during the 
1970s, in the face of policy failures and growing macroeconomic imbalances. Their 
performance in terms of productivity, investment, production and profits turned out to be 
significantly better than that of large firms (Barca and Magnani 1989). Italy did, therefore, 
find a partial solution to mitigate inflexibility.  
New social demands emerged. They were met by a progressive widening of the fiscal deficit. 
The level of Italian public debt had remained almost stationary until the end of the 1960s, 
well below 40 per cent of GDP. By 1980 it reached 60 per cent and in 1994, at its peak 
before the recent financial crisis, it amounted to 125 per cent of the national product (Fig.1). 
Italy is the only major European country where, after the substantial reduction registered in 
the first years after WW2, public debt relative to GDP climbed back to the values recorded 
in the second quarter of the century. 
This rise stemmed from the strong increases of primary expenditures in the first half of the 
seventies (from 31.2 per cent in 1970 to 37.6 per cent of GDP in 1975), which, however, still 
remained below the levels registered in France and Germany. Social transfers rose from 13.1 
per cent GDP in 1960 to 18 per cent GDP by 1980 (Table 10). Italy looks similar to many 
other European countries regarding the expansion of welfare, even if the gap to be filled with 
regard to demands for social spending was wider, given the low initial conditions. What is 
distinctive in Italy is that the adjustment was made by keeping fiscal pressure constant and 
thus by allowing a fiscal deficit to emerge which over time led to a rapid increase in the 
public debt to GDP ratio (Balassone et al. 2010). In the first half of the 1970s, intense social 
conflict discouraged counterbalancing revenue increases. It was politically more viable to let 
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public debt, inflation and the fiscal drag do the job of finding a new though unstable 
macroeconomic equilibrium.  
Moreover, the composition of revenues became less favourable. Table 10 reports a 
substantial rise in distortionary taxation between the mid 1960s and the mid 1990s which 
went along with higher social transfers but also reflects the increased outlays for interest 
payments on the public debt. Research by the OECD suggests that a growth-friendly tax 
system will have low rates of corporate tax and collect a high proportion of its revenue from 
consumption taxes (Johansson et al. 2008). In both these respects, Italy was relatively badly 
placed. Against the general European trend, corporate income tax rates increased from 36 
per cent at the end of the 1970s to 52 per cent in the mid 1990s while Italy had the lowest C-
efficiency score for value-added tax in Europe.  
The broad profile of monetary policies was similar in Italy and abroad; a tendency towards 
accommodation (actually more pronounced in Italy), followed at the end of the Seventies by 
a more restrictive stance in the context of the “Volcker turn” and participation in the 
European monetary system. According to the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Guido Carli, 
(Banca d‟Italia 1975) monetary policy couldn‟t react effectively to the slackening fiscal 
discipline because this would have amounted to a “seditious act” against the State5. In fact, 
driven by enormous nominal wage increases (17 per cent on a yearly basis between 1971 and 
1975; real wages increased by almost 5 per cent a year), the oil shock and the devaluation of 
the lira, prices exploded.  
However, some authors believe that the degree of freedom in shaping macroeconomic 
policies was actually higher. Spinelli and Fratianni (1991), Andreatta and d‟Adda (1985) and 
Onofri and Basevi (1997) underline that with a more market oriented policy culture it would 
have been possible to implement more virtuous policies in the aftermath of the first oil 
shock, as other European countries did. Their critique is severe; Italian economic policy in 
the Seventies was basically founded on the irrelevance of the public budget constraint, on the 
dependence of monetary policy on budget needs and on a dirigiste approach of public 
interventions.  
Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) argue instead that Italian macro-policy in the second half of 
the Seventies reduced the costs of disinflation later, because it delivered high profit margins 
and financed new capital equipment such that pressure could be more easily exerted on 
industry to reduce costs. Boltho (1986), noting the still positive growth differential between 
Italy and the other advanced economies, supports this argument, by pointing to the beneficial 
effects of expansionary policy during the whole decade on the development of small and 
medium size firms.  
                                                          
5
 With the support of the IMF there was a serious attempt in 1974 to impose monetary restriction as had been 
successfully done in 1963; however, in spite of initial improvements in the balance of payments and in inflation 
in the subsequent cyclical recovery,  the monetary stance soon turned permissive.  
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In the second half of the seventies, in the middle of a dramatic crisis threatening the very 
survival of democracy, the participation of the communist party in the coalition supporting 
the government (1976‐1979: “governi di solidarietà nazionale”) allowed a deceleration of 
inflation and public debt growth;  the willingness, albeit cautious, of trade unions to take into 
account the compatibility of  wage dynamics with  macroeconomic equilibrium induced 
wage moderation, increased profits and indirectly supported technological restructuring 
processes. In 1979, the coalition broke up. Within a short time span, entrepreneurs regained 
control of production processes in large firms, strengthened by the substantial labour‐saving 
process innovations undertaken in the preceding years (Barca and Magnani 1989). 
Around 1980, three events marked a turning‐point in economic policy: the participation in 
the European Monetary System, the Bank of Italy‐Treasury “divorce” (by which the Bank 
was freed from the obligation of buying the unsold public debt at Treasury auctions), which  
was aimed at inducing virtuous behaviour by the public sector by through increasing the cost 
of issuing new debt, and the introduction of a form of incomes policy, through the 
predetermination of automatic inflation‐related pay rises in order to guide price expectations. 
The first decision represented an attempt to “force” a reduction of costs in the sector exposed 
to foreign competition via a partial and delayed realignment of the nominal exchange rate in 
response to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. The effectiveness of this policy with 
respect to that implemented in the first half of the 1970s is clearly shown by the different 
price dynamics after the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979.  
In the 1980s, the conditions for addressing macroeconomic disequilibria looked more 
favourable than in the 1970s. Governments could rely on stable majorities. The drastic fall in 
oil prices reduced inflation and increased, ceteris paribus, available resources. After 1983, 
the major economies entered a long expansionary cycle. The “wage‐push age” was definitely 
over and the concept of incomes policy (Tarantelli 1981) was, even if painfully, gaining 
some ground
6
. Monetary policy, by pursuing flexibly an exchange rate target, was an 
important factor in reducing inflation from 1979 to 1986 (Gressani, Guiso and Visco 1987). 
The adjustment was, however, incomplete. Inflation reached a low point in 1987 of slightly 
less than 5 per cent after the fall of oil prices but rose back to 6 per cent at the beginning of 
the nineties, two percentage points more than the European average, mainly because of the 
existence of strong competition barriers in the non‐traded sector (Barca and Visco 1993) and 
a still excessive wage growth. During 1985‐1991, the nominal exchange rate changed little; 
competitiveness, measured by goods prices, worsened by 12 per cent, in terms of unit labour 
costs by more than 15 per cent. The current account, balanced in 1986, weakened gradually 
to a deficit of 2 per cent of GDP in 1991. Firms were slow to react to competitive pressure 
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  However, the degree of the difficulties in progressing along this road is indicated by the fact that the main 
instigator of these proposals, Ezio Tarantelli, was assassinated by left-wing terrorists in 1986.  
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by improving the quality of products and shifting towards more innovation‐intensive 
production. 
The major obstacle to complete adjustment was the inability to deal with the public debt 
problem. Programmes to reduce deficits were regularly discarded. Though there was some 
progress in the final years of the decade, primary deficits generally remained substantial 
(Fig.2). Public debt rose further from 60 percent of GDP in 1980 to more than 100 per cent 
in 1991. The foreign sector purchased significant amounts of State bonds attracted by the 
stability of the exchange rate and high interest rates. The negative net investment position of 
the country climbed up to more than 10 per cent of GDP.  
The long-term implications of allowing the debt ratio to increase so much are unfavourable 
for growth, as is highlighted in particular by growth models of the overlapping-generations 
variety. The adverse impacts can occur through a number of transmission mechanisms 
including reductions in market-sector capital formation, higher long-term interest rates and 
higher tax rates. Empirical research on advanced economies has found negative effects; for 
example, Kumar and Woo (2010) estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in the initial 
debt to GDP ratio is associated with a fall of about 0.2 percentage points in growth. It has 
also been suggested that the adverse effect on growth becomes substantial once the debt ratio 
reaches a critical level which has recently been claimed to be around 90 per cent of GDP 
(Checherita and Rother 2010). 
The risks inherent in the rising public debt ratio were clearly perceived, as shown by the 
continuous attempts to reduce the fiscal unbalances. There was no effective policy reaction 
because of the structural weakness of political power, more and more dependent on a 
multitude of powerful interest groups, unions often included.
7
 The failure to address the 
increase in public debt in a far better macroeconomic context than that of the 1970s must to 
be considered as a major missed opportunity. 
In the period between the end of the Golden Age and the beginning of the Nineties the 
special development policy for the South got into growing difficulties; the reduction of the 
income gap came to a halt. The oil shock, the changing technological and competitive 
framework, and the increased rigidity of the labour market made this policy less and less 
effective (Iuzzolino et al. 2011). The progressive decline of IRI disproportionately reduced 
the efficiency of investments in the South, where the State-controlled firms played a decisive 
role. A similar degeneration process undermined the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, whose 
technical autonomy and authority were put in question. Last, but not least, the attribution of 
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 This historical feature of Italian society is sharpened especially by the progressive loss of influence of 
traditional popular parties, in particular – but not only –  the Christian Democratic party that had ruled the 
country since 1945, which in the past had managed at least partially to reconcile the different demands by 
taking into account the conditions for sustainable growth. 
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relevant powers to the newly constituted Regions increased significantly the costs of 
coordination of regional policies and made local lobbies more powerful.  
Special development policy tended gradually to replace rather than add resources to the 
ordinary State policy. From the beginning of the Seventies up to 1992, total net current 
public transfers in the South became more negative by 3 percentage points of its GDP, from 
-3.5 to -6.5 but in the rest of the country they plunged from -13 to -20 per cent of GDP  of 
these regions. Including labour income, in the South often reflecting a disguised social 
assistance policy, net public resources flowing to the South increased slightly from 11 to 
almost 12 per cent of GDP; those pouring out from the Centre-North from -3 to -10 per cent 
of GDP (Magnani 1997a). The divergence in public net flows was not due mainly to 
expenditures but to taxes, these latter directly related to the level of incomes in the two parts 
of the country. However, what matters more is the fact that the composition of public 
expenditure flowing into the South started to shift more and more in favour of current 
transfers and labour income, with negative effects on the growth prospects of the Southern 
economy on the one hand and the national public budget on the other (Cannari and Chiri 
2006; Staderini and Vadalà 2009). An implicit redistribution of resources therefore took 
place in the aftermath of the extension of the welfare state to the whole country. From being 
a factor supporting Italian growth, the relative stagnation of South gradually became a drain 
on public resources. 
To sum up, supply side adjustments in the 1970s were much more limited than elsewhere in 
Europe because of the policy constraints resulting from the social and political emergency. 
In the subsequent decade, the long shadow of the Seventies mainly took the form of a lack of 
political leadership in subduing the pressure of interest groups which was a precondition for 
ensuring a sustainable path for the public finances. The crisis of 1992 exploded because of a 
combination of factors affecting the whole EMS (Eichengreen 2000) and the failure to 
correct the above-mentioned disequilibria. Italy was forced to exit the EMS. This crisis 
finally did induce some long overdue macro adjustments. 
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4. From the 1990s to the Eve of the Crisis 
After the mid-1990s the western European catch-up of the United States in terms of labour 
productivity ceased. Whereas between 1973 and 1995 real GDP/hour worked grew at 2.6 per 
cent per year in Europe and 1.3 per cent in the United States between 1995 and 2007 these 
growth rates were 1.2 and 2.1 per cent, respectively. So, the end of catch-up reflected both 
European slowing down and American speeding up. At about this point, employment started 
to grow faster than population in Europe but it no longer did so in the United States and the 
potential of ICT for productivity increased considerably, a potential that was more fully 
realized by the American than the European economy. ICT expenditure as a share of GDP 
averaged 2.2 per cent in the late 1990s compared with 4.0 per cent in the United States and 
in Sweden (Timmer and van Ark, 2005) and productivity growth was especially weak in the 
service sector, averaging only 0.2 per cent year between 1993 and 2007 (Broadberry et al. 
2010), where ICT had strong effects in the United States. These developments were 
important as proximate sources of the turn round in relative productivity performance. 
To quite a large extent, productivity growth in Italy reflected these tendencies. The growth of 
real GDP per hour worked fell from 2.35 per cent in 1973-95 to 0.46 per cent in 1995-2007 
while the growth of hours worked per person went from -0.14 to +0.87 (Table 11). This 
latter can be expected to have reduced labour productivity growth in the short to medium 
term if investment failed to respond and the additional workers were lower quality; (Dew-
Becker and Gordon 2008). Nevertheless, productivity growth was very disappointing even 
by European standards, suggesting that there was more to it than this. 
This poor performance came even though Italy went through a period of major policy 
reforms during the 1990s including privatization, anti-trust, banking and company law 
reforms which seemed appropriate as moves in the direction of reform required by a higher 
level of economic development. The 1992 crisis added momentum to reform and “the entire 
political system born after World War II came to an end” (Pagano and Trento 2003, p.199). 
The big devaluation of the lira in 1992-1995 delivered a sharp improvement of 
competitiveness and confidence was for the time being restored. Significant progress was 
made in reducing the public debt to GDP ratio which declined from 125 per cent in 1994 to 
103 per cent in 2004.  
We need, therefore, to confront the puzzle of why growth performance deteriorated rather 
than improved. There seem to be two key reasons for this. First, Italy was relatively badly 
placed to exploit the opportunities of the ICT era. The diffusion of this new technology was 
hindered by the small size of firms, oppressive regulation, and shortfalls in human capital by 
comparison with the European leaders in the take up of ICT. Second, supply-side reform did 
not go far enough especially given the context of joining the Eurozone. In several respects, 
including the legal system, competition policy, regulation and privatization, reforms were 
either incomplete or inadequately implemented. 
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The international evidence is that the diffusion of ICT has been significantly inhibited in 
countries which are heavily regulated. Employment protection has been shown to deter 
investment in ICT equipment (Gust and Marquez 2004) because reorganizing working 
practices and upgrading the labour force, which are central to realizing the productivity 
potential of ICT, are made more expensive. Restrictive product market regulation has 
deterred investment in ICT capital directly (Conway et al. 2006) and the indirect effect of 
regulation in raising costs has been relatively pronounced in sectors that use ICT intensively. 
There has been a strong correlation between product market regulation and the contribution 
of ICT-using services (notably distribution) to overall productivity growth (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2005). The general story is not that regulation has become more stringent but 
rather that existing regulation became more costly in the context of a new technological era.  
This account clearly has resonance for Italy. Italy entered the ICT era with relatively high 
levels of regulation, albeit decreasing over time as reforms took place (Tables 8 and 9). The 
estimates in Tables 12 and 13 indicate that investment in intangible capital has been low and 
that the productivity growth contributions both of ICT capital and also of intangible capital 
have been very modest. International comparisons confirm that ICT investment has been 
held back in Italy by regulation and a shortfall in human capital (Conway et al. 2006).    
Microeconomic studies of Italian manufacturing confirm this picture while adding further 
insights as to why diffusion of ICT had been relatively slow in Italy. The take-up of ICT has 
been strongly correlated with firm size and changes in organizational structure (Fabiani et al. 
2005). In this context, Bugamelli and Pagano (2004) found that many firms appear to be 
constrained in their ICT investment by the adjustment costs associated with reorganization, 
especially if their workforce has relatively low levels of human capital. These reflect 
regulatory burdens but, because they are fixed costs, they bear very heavily on the small- and 
medium-size firms that have been central to Italy‟s distinctive variety of capitalism.8  
Turning to supply-side policy reforms, there are a number of shortfalls that deserve to be 
highlighted. One major point is that their effectiveness in promoting competition has been 
insufficient. The retail sector is an important example. Labour productivity growth in 
retailing was 0.8 percent per year in 1995-2002 compared with 7.4 per cent in the United 
States and 1.6 per cent in the EU15 (McGuckin et al. 2005). It is clear that productivity 
performance was still impaired by regulation; barriers to entry and mark-ups in retailing 
remained high on average with adverse consequences for TFP (Daveri et al. 2010). 
However, in districts where competition was stimulated by the 1998 regulatory reform both 
ICT investment and labour productivity increased (Schivardi and Viviano 2011).  
The competition-policy framework established in the 1990s has been rated below average 
relative to OECD countries using criteria relating to political independence, toughness and 
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 In the mid-1990s, mean employment in Italian manufacturing firms was only 42 per cent of the EU15 average 
(Pagano and Schivardi 2003).  
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investigative powers with the implication that productivity growth has been adversely 
affected (Buccirossi et al. 2009), low-efficiency producers continued to survive in many 
sectors (Milana et al. 2008), and mark-ups in the service sector as a whole remained high 
(Table 9). Failure to de-regulate professional services, where in 2008 Italy still had the 
tightest product-market regulation in Europe after Luxembourg, has had significant adverse 
effects on the productivity of sectors for which they are important inputs (Barone and 
Cingano 2011). On the contrary, the reform process was successful in the banking sector 
where competition increased significantly.    
The volume of privatization in Italy was impressive; in terms of the proceeds, second only to 
the UK during the period 1979 to 1999. However, it was mainly aimed at reducing public 
debt. Only 30 per cent of the value of transactions involved a transfer of control, 
opportunities to introduce competition in utilities like electricity and gas were missed, and 
regulation was inadequate. There were improvements in operating efficiency in sectors 
exposed to competition but not in sheltered sectors where it appears that privatization was 
simply conducive to increased quasi rents as market power was exploited more fully 
(Barucci and Pierobon 2007).
9
  
While, on the surface, reforms to corporate governance might have enabled  an effective 
market for corporate control, in practice changes in ownership and control structures 
(pyramids have been replaced by coalitions) have been quite limited, private benefits of 
control seem to have remained high, and the number of listed companies has increased only 
slightly (Bianchi and Bianco 2006). Bloom and van Reenen (2008) found that the quality of 
management in Italian companies in 2006 was below leading international standards, largely 
as a result of weak competition and family control, with adverse implications for 
productivity performance. The effectiveness of company law reforms has been limited by 
established interests and the deep rooted Italian difficulty of linking economic and legal 
culture (Ciocca 2007). 
The supply-side reform agenda has been also undermined by the inadequacy of the legal 
system (Bianco et al. 2008; Carmignani and Giacomelli 2010) and the ineffectiveness of the 
government. The low rankings of Italy in the World Bank‟s Governance Indicators reported 
in Table 14 underline this point. Similarly, Italy has a low „ease of doing business‟ ranking 
(80
th
 in the most recent year) in the World Bank‟s Doing Business report with enforcement 
of contracts seen as especially poor (157
th
)
 10
. 
Other important factors for long run growth are of course less responsive to policy, at least in 
the short run. In spite of progress, especially after WWII, the gap in human capital, measured 
                                                          
9
 Sheltered sectors include energy companies, banks, municipal utilities, airport management companies, 
Autostrade, and Telecom Italia. 
10
 It should be recognized that there are substantial regional variations in bureaucratic burdens on business 
within Italy; they are generally more onerous in the South and the Islands (Bianco and Bripi 2010). 
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by the number of years of education, remained significant compared with the other advanced 
countries. The percentage of persons aged 25 to 64 who attained at least an upper secondary 
education was around 32 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, almost ten points below 
OECD average. With respect to tertiary education, the gap widened: 12 per cent vis-a-vis 24 
per cent (OECD 2010).  
Whereas in terms of the quantity of education Italy has slowly caught up, quality has lagged 
behind. The evidence provided by student competencies is quite clear in this regard. The 
picture is especially worrying with regard to cognitive skills as measured by performance in 
international tests such as the OECD PISA studies. Italy now ranks very low, especially in 
mathematics, and its average performance has been declining steadily since the mid-1970s in 
stark contrast with countries like Finland and Sweden (Hanushek and Woessmann 2009). 
The econometric evidence suggests that this has exacted a serious penalty in terms of an 
adverse effect on growth. 
Among the possible reasons for the relatively low quality of education in Italy, we must 
exclude a shortfall in educational spending; on the contrary, Italy spends more per student 
than many countries which achieve much better results. Instead, a relaxation of educational 
standards in the 1970s and an inability to achieve coherent reforms seem to have played a 
significant role (Bertola and Sestito 2011). Moreover, international comparisons show that 
efficiency of schooling resources is enhanced by accountability, autonomy in hiring 
decisions, and effective competition within the school system which all raise standards 
(Woesmann et al. 2007). The issue is the organization of the school system which has been 
ineffective in addressing principal-agent problems in the delivery of education. Examined 
through this lens, Italy has lagged behind other countries especially in terms of lack of 
autonomy of schools in providing incentives and sanctions to teachers; in recent years, 
accountability has been weakened through not having external exit exams (Boarini 2007). In 
the Golden Age, given the prevailing technology, the lack of formal education was not a 
serious constraint on growth because informal knowledge formation such as on-the-job 
training compensated. However, at more advanced stages of technological development, the 
gaps in formal education, in particular tertiary education, have mattered because it is 
essential in fostering innovation (Bertola and Sestito 2011). 
 
 
Another important structural factor potentially hindering growth is Italy‟s „anomalous‟ 
position in international trade which has its roots in the strength of small and medium-sized 
firms producing in industrial districts (De Benedictis 2005). Revealed comparative 
advantage for Italy exhibits high persistence. Compared with other G7 economies Italy‟s 
exports remain skewed towards low-tech and labour-intensive sectors such as textiles and 
footwear and away from hi-tech activities. This means that Italy is more exposed to 
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competition from China and other dynamic Asian economies and is less well-placed to 
benefit from fast-growing sectors in world trade (Lissovlik 2008) while export performance, 
especially in distant markets, is held back by the small average size of Italian firms (Barba-
Navaretti et al. 2011). 
The implications of the historical legacy reflected in this trade configuration should not be 
exaggerated. The „market-crowding‟ impact on export growth has been much smaller than 
relatively slow growth in the EU15 (Italy‟s main market), and trends in the real exchange 
rate (Breinlich and Tucci 2010). There has been an adverse trend in the terms of external 
trade but the effect only reduced real income growth by 0.1 percentage point over the ten 
years to 2006 (Bennett et al. 2008). Over time, however, the Italian economy is being 
subjected to a greater need to adjust to the changing international division of labour than 
countries like France, Germany or the UK. The big issue here concerns the flexibility of the 
relatively Italian economy; an index recently compiled by OECD economists places Italy 
24
th
 out of 26 countries in terms of ability to cope with globalization.
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European integration moved forward in the 1990s culminating in the establishment of the 
European Monetary Union in 1999. Despite forced exit from EMS in 1992, Italy became a 
founder-member of the Eurozone. The decision to join EMU sought to introduce competitive 
pressures into the system in order to stimulate efficiency improvements and thus to promote 
growth even in the short run via a general improvement of expectations, thereby 
counterbalancing at least partially the deflationary effects of the huge correction to the public 
deficit implemented in order to join EMU.  
In conjunction with the decision to participate in EMU, a radical reform of regional policy 
took place, benefiting from the strong EU commitment to regional and social convergence. 
The basic aim was to spur growth of the whole country by refuelling the catching-up process 
of the South, which had been interrupted in the 1970s, to offset the loss of the exchange-rate 
policy instrument and the severe fiscal clampdown to meet the Maastricht criteria. A new 
regional policy was launched, centred on a place-based approach which looked at innovation 
as the primary driver of development so as to enhance the potential comparative advantages 
of the Southern regions.  
Participation in EMU was a major change in the framework for macroeconomic policy: 
inflation and nominal interest rates converged rapidly towards the European average. For the 
first time in 30 years, price stabilization was finally achieved.  
It also had, however, supply-side implications through the intensification of competition. 
EMU membership can be thought of as a commitment technology; put differently, „Italian 
vices are overcome by importing European virtues‟, as Guido Carli, Governor of the Bank of 
                                                          
11
 The index reflects regulation, education and skills, labour market flexibility, the innovation framework and 
active labour market programmes (Rae and Sollie 2007). 
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Italy, 1960-1975, and Minister of the Treasury, 1989-1992, emphasized retrospectively 
(Carli 1996). With better macroeconomic discipline, interest-rate convergence, and improved 
prospects for fiscal sustainability, investment could respond positively. Overall, then, it 
might be hoped that joining the Euro could be good for growth. In any event, Italy‟s 
participation in EMU amounted to achieving the goal of the postwar generation of Italian 
leaders, anxious to anchor Italy within Europe. It was ultimately a political decision as it was 
the creation of EMU. 
At the same time, EMU membership was not a risk-free strategy, especially for a country 
with weak productivity growth and a high public debt to GDP ratio, given that the Eurozone 
is not an optimal currency area and the European Central Bank‟s choice of interest rates 
might not be ideal from an Italian point of view. There clearly were dangers from a loss of 
international competitiveness and this has materialized. During 1999-2009, the real 
exchange rate measured by prices of production in the manufacturing industry appreciated 
by 7.5 percentage points, compared with an appreciation of 5 points in France and no change 
in Germany. The loss of competitiveness in the whole economy measured in terms of unit 
labour costs was higher at 13 percentage points, compared with a loss of 5 percentage points 
for France and a gain of 13 percentage points for Germany.  
Ex-post, the experience of EMU membership has been much less comfortable than had been 
hoped ex-ante. The benefit to fiscal sustainability anticipated from reduction of the gap 
between the interest rate and the growth rate is threatened by the ineffectiveness of supply-
side reform, weak productivity performance, the loss of competitiveness, and fears about the 
political will to maintain budget discipline. Investment and growth are potentially 
undermined rather than stimulated by a high real exchange rate and debt overhang. The 
growth rate up to the outbreak of the financial crisis (1999‐2008) was half of that of the Euro 
area and of the average for the period 1980‐1999.  
One question obviously arises. Did a superior policy alternative exist? Would growth 
prospects have been more favourable in the case of non-participation? Would it have been 
easier to implement the necessary structural adjustments? The analysis put forward in the 
previous sections suggests that the answer to all these questions is no. The experience of the 
1970s is especially helpful in this regard. At that time, the structural weaknesses of the 
Italian economy, though less relevant because of the more favourable competitive and 
technological context, were already quite evident. The (much-used) freedom of manoeuvre 
granted by the floating exchange rate did not trigger any substantial policy interventions 
aimed at correcting them. On the contrary, the outcome was an unstable macroeconomic 
framework marked by inflation and fiscal laxity, two factors notably pernicious for growth 
in the medium-long run. Either inside or outside EMU, supply-side reforms conducive to 
raising the rate of productivity growth were required; the pressure to make them would have 
been weaker without the prospect of joining the Euro. On the other hand, the consequence of 
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not reforming well enough may eventually be more severe if a sovereign debt crisis is 
precipitated.  
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6. Conclusions 
In a nutshell, the main point of this paper is that, after the Golden Age, Italy experienced 
increasing difficulties in adjusting its economy to the changing external context and to the 
requirements for sustaining catch-up growth at a higher level of economic development. The 
adjustment issue is common to advanced countries but the difficulties experienced in Italy 
look particularly severe. The point is both that Italy had a greater need for reform after the 
success of the early postwar period and that Italy had more problems in making effective 
reforms. 
In the Golden Age it was different. The Italian performance in terms of growth and 
productivity was spectacular even taking account of the catching up effect. The postwar 
settlement was heavily conditioned by the external policy environment but the main policy 
choices were not disrupted by the harsh conflicts, reflecting somehow the sense of national 
responsibility of the political and economical leadership emerging from the war. The wage 
moderation determined by the unlimited labour supply in the agricultural sector, the features 
of human capital particularly suited to the existing technologies, the impulse to 
industrialization given directly and indirectly by the large state owned firms, the effective 
allocation of resources provided by the banks controlled by the State, the capacity of private 
entrepreneurs in enhancing their performance especially in the traditional sectors, the 
liberalization of trade and participation in the Common Market were all growth-promoting 
factors. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, after the “economic miracle”, this model was put under 
pressure and attempts to correct the destabilizing forces generated by the model itself failed. 
The wage and the oil shock around 1970 on the one hand and the decline of Fordism on the 
other engendered everywhere in Europe – albeit in different forms and at varying speeds – 
macro and micro adjustment processes. Italy changed relatively little. Having arrived near to 
the technology frontier, the economy proved too slow to adjust to the new context, in spite of 
the success in mitigating inflexibilities by developing a regionalized model of capitalism 
based on small and medium firms. 
Cushioned by inflation and devaluation, growth remained relatively high in the 1970s. In the 
subsequent decade, in spite of improved conditions for addressing macroeconomic 
disequilibria (the long expansionary cycle of the major economies, the end of the “wage 
push era”, the deceleration of inflation, the new monetary policy after joining the EMS) 
structural adjustments  were neglected, in particular with regard to fiscal discipline and 
competition policies in sheltered sectors. The catching up of the South came to a halt. 
Major supply side reforms were eventually implemented in the aftermath of the 1992 crisis 
and also in connection with the policies undertaken in the EU. Nevertheless, in the second 
half of the decade growth fell below the EU average. These reforms were an important step 
in the right direction but ultimately fell short of what was required. While increasing the 
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pressure for adjustments through price and exchange-rate stability and more stringent 
constraints on fiscal policy – participation in EMU did not help as far as the improvement of 
growth prospects was concerned. Clearly, this has made Italy‟s position in terms of fiscal 
sustainability weaker and has therefore made the country more vulnerable in the crisis which 
has erupted since 2007. 
Why did policy reform prove unable to stimulate growth? More specifically, what were the 
major difficulties in implementing sufficient structural adjustments after the Golden Age, in 
spite of the growing awareness of their necessity? These are the crucial questions we must 
try to answer. We can tentatively list a number of not unrelated reasons. 
The first refers to a long standing feature of Italian society, i.e., the existence and severity, 
except for very limited periods, of conflicts between opposing groups and parties. In part, 
but by no means only, these were connected to the big ideological divide between the strong 
communist-oriented opposition and the ruling parties. Reforms in the history of the country 
are rare; much more commons are periods of violent conflicts or of policy stalemates 
because of the veto power of the opposing actors. In the 1970s, this feature stands out most 
clearly and made reform almost impossible. In the 1980s, the „divided society‟ started to 
take other forms, less based on (declining) ideologies and more on the gradual proliferation 
of many consolidated interest groups, each one seeking to gain rents at the expense of others. 
This basically explains the inadequacy of the adjustment in public finances.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall – we come here to the second possible reason – the demise 
of the two main parties, the Communists and the Christian Democrats, worsened the picture. 
It may seem paradoxical in the light of the end of the ideological divide, but these two forces 
were somehow able, each one within its area of influence, to represent the different interests 
of their constituencies in a policy vision which reached beyond them and looked at the 
perspectives of the country as a whole. Their disappearance strengthened instead the 
emergence of distributional coalitions at the expense of encompassing organizations (Olson, 
1982) and stabilization (Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
The third reason concerns firms. Their capability to exploit favourable conditions varied 
through time. They were able to do so during the Golden Age thanks to the low wages and to 
the opening of the economy to external competition. In the 1970s, they overcame the 
emergency because of devaluation and generous fiscal policy; at the end of the decade large 
firms were able to renew the capital stock while small firms reacted by developing an 
original locally-based model. Later, however, when the technological context started to 
change and required more product innovations, more ICT investments and corresponding 
changes in the organization of the production process, Italian firms got into increasing 
difficulties which still continue. The difficulty of achieving efficient allocations of 
entrepreneurial resources resulting from closed corporate governance structures centred on 
family-controlled and pyramidal groups proved to be a major competitive handicap in this 
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context. The gradual elimination of the exchange rate lever in the face of mounting 
competition from the emerging markets and the increased stringency of fiscal policy could 
not be overcome. One can, of course, argue about the relative importance of firm 
endogenous and contextual factors but there seems to be little doubt that there is a 
historically-rooted weakness of large private firms in Italy compared with other major 
European countries. The importance of state-owned enterprises (born from the ashes of the 
large industrial and financial private conglomerations) between the 1930s and the 1990s – a 
unique case in Western Europe – indirectly reflects this fact. In any case, whatever the 
historical reasons, this implies a greater need for supply-side policy reform compared with 
elsewhere.  
The fourth reason is related to this conclusion. There might be a structural problem in the 
implementation of change because of a lack of political leadership in reforming the Public 
Administration to increase its effectiveness. The importance of and the reasons for this have 
been widely debated during the whole history of united Italy and invests all the domains of 
economic policy. We conjecture that this weakness is related to the increasing influence of 
interest groups which invade both the Public Administration and the polity. In any event, 
since the quality of institutions and public services are important for growth, especially in 
the context of coping with globalization, lagging behind on this front entails serious risks.  
The disappointing performance of the South in the last thirty years shows this very clearly 
because it is in these regions that these lags are mostly concentrated. The funds employed 
were remarkable, comparable with those of the golden years of special development policy. 
However the new policy failed to meet its ambitious objectives mainly because of the 
inadequacy of national policies, whose target is the whole national territory rather than 
regional policy per se (Cannari, Magnani and Pellegrini 2010). Education, justice, security 
are growth and productivity promoting factors. Their weakness explains much of the 
unsatisfactory performance of the Italian economy. The Doing Business indicators reported 
in Table 15, which are strictly related to the quality of public services and administration, are 
in the South even weaker than in the rest of Italy, and far below the average of European 
countries. The factors hindering growth of the Southern economy in the last twenty years are 
of the same nature of those which curb the Italian economy as whole. In the South they are, 
however, more powerful. In this sense, the Southern question is today more than ever the 
magnifying mirror of Italy‟s difficulties.  
The poor quality of public services brings us to the final point, i.e. the changes in the 
political institutional design so as to increase the possibility of taking substantial policy 
decisions. The theme has quite a tradition in the political economy literature. The issue 
concerns the relationship between political institutions and the functioning of the economy. 
In particular, it has been often argued that the electoral rule is an important factor for the 
economic performance of a country (Persson and Tabellini 2005). In Italy, the crisis of 1992 
marked the end of the so called First Republic. Widespread criticism was addressed in 
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particular to the strictly proportional electoral law for its alleged feature of producing a 
plethora of parties, thus often not allowing the government to rule with the necessary 
stability because of the power of even small players and the resulting tendency to look for 
compromises and even to change majorities in order to survive. The principle of 
“alternation” was invoked, so that clear policy options could be implemented by the winning 
coalitions during their mandate. A majority rule was introduced in 1993; it remained in force 
till 2005, when it was replaced by an adjusted proportional system. The results of the 
majority rule in terms of stability of the governments and the number of parties were, 
however, not encouraging (Bordignon and Monticini 2011). This suggests that easy solutions 
in terms of institutional engineering do not exist as far as the structure of the political system 
and, a fortiori, as far as the capacity to implement structural economic reforms are 
concerned. 
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Table 1. Trade Costs: Italy with various partner countries 
 Germany UK Spain USA India 
1929 1.10 1.22 1.63 1.26 1.54 
1950 1.27 1.36 2.40 1.40 1.97 
1960 1.01 1.25 1.54 1.29 2.00 
1970 0.79 1.21 1.42 1.22 2.30 
1980 0.61 0.86 1.08 1.13 1.86 
1990 0.56 0.84 0.87 1.13 1.85 
2000 0.66 0.90 0.87 1.14 1.83 
 
Notes: trade costs are inferred from a gravity model of trade flows and comprise both policy 
and non-policy barriers to trade; world average trade costs normalized to 1950 = 100 were 
98 in 1970, 82 in 1980 and 84 in 2000. 
Source: data underlying Jacks et al. (2011) generously provided by Dennis Novy 
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Table 2. Capital Account Openness and Foreign-Owned Assets/World GDP (per cent) 
a) Capital Account Openness 
 World 
Average 
 Italy 
1890-1913 99.7 1950/4 37.5 
  1955/9 50 
1949 42 1960/4 67.5 
1950s 53 1965/9 75 
1960s 55 1970/4 75 
1970s 47 1975/9 75 
1980s 50 1980/4 75 
1990s 68 1985/9 85 
2000-5 78 1990/4 92.5 
  1995/9 100 
 
b) Foreign-Owned Assets/World GDP 
1870   7 
1914 18 
1945   5 
1960   6 
1980 25 
2000 92 
 
Sources:  capital account openness from Quinn (2003) and data appendix to Quinn and 
Toyoda (2008); foreign-owned assets/world GDP from Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). 
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Table 3. Shares of World Output and World Exports of Manufactures (per cent) 
a) Output 
 1953 1973 1990 2007 
Western Europe 26.1 24.5 32.9 22.4 
North America 46.9 35.1 23.4 25.7 
Japan   2.9   8.8 16.8 16.5 
China   2.3   3.9   2.7 11.2 
India   1.7   2.1   1.5   1.6 
Other Asia   1.0   3.1   4.9   8.6 
Rest of World 19.1 22.5 17.8 14.0 
 
b) Exports 
 1953 1973 1990 2007 
Western Europe 51.9 55.9 54.2 40.8 
North America 35.8 16.1 15.2 11.9 
Japan   2.9   9.6 11.5   6.7 
China   0.1   0.6   1.9 11.9 
Rest of Asia   1.6   4.5 11.1 16.5 
Rest of World   7.7 13.3   6.1   8.3 
 
Sources: output from Bairoch (1982), United Nations (1965) and UNIDO (2002) (2009); 
exports from United Nations (1958) (1976) and WTO (2001) (2008) 
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Table 4. Real GDP Measured at Purchasing Power Parity  
a) Levels and Growth Rates of Real GDP/Person 
 1950 
($GK 1990) 
1973 
($GK 1990) 
2007 
($GK 
1990) 
Growth 
Rate, 1950-
73 
(per cent 
p.a.) 
Growth 
Rates, 1973-
2007 
(per cent 
p.a.) 
Western Europe 4569 11392 21589 4.05 1.91 
USA 9561 16689 31357 2.45 1.88 
Japan 1921 11434 22950 8.07 2.07 
China   448     838   6303 2.76 6.12 
India   619     853   2817 1.41 3.57 
Asian Tigers   955   3631 21212 5.98 5.34 
World Average 2111   4083   7468 2.91 1.80 
 
b) Shares of World GDP (per cent) 
 1950 1973 1990 2007 
Western Europe 26.2 25.6 22.2 17.5 
North America 29.2 24.0 23.3 20.8 
Japan   3.0   7.8   8.6   5.9 
China   4.5   4.6   7.8 16.8 
India   4.2   3.1   4.0   6.4 
Other Asia   4.8   5.2   8.0 10.2 
Rest of World 28.1 29.7 26.1 22.4 
 
Source:  Maddison (2003) with updates from website. 
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Table 5. Levels and Rates of Growth of Real GDP/Person in Western European 
Countries, 1950-73 
 ($1990GK and per cent per year) 
 Y/P 1950 Y/P 1973 Growth Rate, 
1950-73 
Switzerland 9064 18204 3.08 
Denmark 6943 13945 3.08 
UK 6939 12025 2.42 
Sweden 6739 12494 3.06 
Netherlands 5971 13081 3.45 
Belgium 5462 12170 3.54 
Norway 5430 11324 3.24 
France 5186 12824 4.02 
West Germany 4281 13153 5.02 
Finland 4253 11085 4.25 
Austria 3706 11235 4.94 
Italy 3502 10634 4.95 
Ireland 3453   6867 3.03 
Spain 2189   7661 5.60 
Portugal 2086   7063 5.45 
Greece 1915   7655 6.21 
 
Source: The Conference Board (2011) 
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Table 6. Contribution of Structural Change to Labour Productivity Growth, 1950-73 
(per cent per year) 
 Orthodox Measure Broadberry Measure 
Denmark 0.24 1.10 
France 0.00 0.52 
Italy 0.83 1.77 
Netherlands -0.31 0.29 
Spain 0.80 1.77 
Sweden 0.00 0.60 
UK -0.12 0.31 
West Germany 0.18 0.77 
 
Note: the orthodox approach considers that the contribution of structural change equals 
ΔAO/AO – ΣΔAi/Ai*Ai/AO*Si where A is labour productivity, S is share of employment and 
the subscripts O and i stand for the whole economy and sector i, respectively (Nordhaus, 
1972). Broadberry (1998) modified this so that labour productivity growth in declining 
sectors is measured using the overall rate of labour force growth not the sectoral rate. 
Source: derived from van Ark (1996) based on a three-sector decomposition (agriculture, 
industry, services) where agriculture is deemed to be the declining sector. 
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Table 7. Levels and Rates of Growth of Real GDP per Person and per Hour Worked, 
1973-1995 ($GK1990 and per cent per year) 
a) Real GDP/Person 
 Y/P 1973 Y/P 1995 Growth Rate, 
1973-95 
Switzerland 18204 20627 0.58 
Denmark 13945 20350 1.74 
Sweden 13494 17648 1.23 
West Germany 13153 19849 1.92 
Netherlands 13081 18700 1.65 
France 12824 18206 1.61 
Belgium 12170 18270 1.87 
UK 12025 17586 1.75 
Norway 11324 21578 2.96 
Austria 11235 17959 2.16 
Finland 11085 15970 1.88 
Italy 10634 17216 2.21 
Spain   7661 13132 2.48 
Greece   7655 10321 1.37 
Portugal   7063 11614 2.29 
Ireland   6867 12734 2.85 
b) Real GDP/Hour Worked 
 Y/HW 
1973 
Y/HW 1995 Growth Rate, 
1973-95 
Sweden 18.01 23.13 1.15 
Switzerland 17.86 21.92 0.95 
Belgium 17.42 30.37 2.56 
Netherlands 17.32 27.75 2.17 
West Germany 16.05 30.83 3.01 
Denmark 15.88 26.98 2.44 
France 15.63 29.02 2.85 
Norway 15.06 29.82 3.15 
Italy 14.58 24.29 2.35 
UK 13.37 24.33 2.76 
Austria 13.20 23.50 2.66 
Finland 11.60 22.36 3.03 
Spain   9.92 22.21 3.72 
Portugal   9.33 13.60 1.74 
Ireland   8.18 17.21 3.43 
Greece   8.07 11.63 1.68 
Note: estimates for Ireland are based on GNP 
Source: The Conference Board (2011) 
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Table 8. Employment Protection (0-4) 
 1960 1980 2000 2008 
Austria 1.10 1.92 2.21 1.93 
Belgium 1.38 3.21 2.18 2.18 
Denmark 1.90 2.30 1.50 1.50 
Finland 2.30 2.30 2.09 1.96 
France 0.75 2.80 2.98 3.05 
Germany 0.80 3.21 2.34 2.12 
Greece   3.50 2.73 
Ireland 0.00 0.90 0.93 1.11 
Italy 3.45 3.60 2.51 1.89 
Netherlands 2.70 2.70 2.12 1.95 
Norway 2.91 2.91 2.56 2.69 
Portugal  4.00 3.67 3.15 
Spain 4.00 3.87 2.93 2.98 
Sweden 0.00 3.50 2.24 1.87 
Switzerland 1.00 1.00 1.14 1.14 
UK 0.27 0.60 0.68 0.75 
     
USA 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
 
Sources: Nickell (2006) and OECD (2010) 
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Table 9. Product Market Regulation (0-6) and Price-Cost Margins 
 
Sources: PMR indicator for 1975 and 1990 from Conway and Nicoletti (2006) and for 1998 
and 2008 from Wolfl et al. (2009); the 1975 and 1990 numbers are not comparable with 
those for the later years.  Price-cost margins from Hoj et al. (2007) refer to the mid-1990s.  
 
 PCM PCM PMR PMR PMR PMR 
 Manufactures Services 1975 1990 1998 2008 
Austria 1.15 1.28 5.2 4.5 2.33 1.45 
Belgium 1.10 1.20 5.5 5.3 2.17 1.43 
Denmark 1.11 1.25 5.5 4.7 1.59 1.06 
Finland 1.18 1.27 5.5 4.6 2.08 1.19 
France 1.12 1.26 6.0 5.2 2.52 1.45 
Germany 1.13 1.25 5.2 4.6 2.06 1.33 
Greece   5.7 5.7 2.99 2.37 
Ireland   5.7 5.0 1.65 0.92 
Italy 1.15 1.38 5.8 5.8 2.59 1.38 
Netherlands 1.13 1.24 5.6 5.6 1.66 0.97 
Norway 1.13 1.26 5.5 4.5 1.85 1.16 
Portugal   5.9 5.3 2.25 1.43 
Spain 1.14  5.1 4.7 2.55 1.03 
Sweden 1.11 1.17 4.5 4.4 1.93 1.30 
Switzerland   4.1 4.2 2.48 1.18 
UK 1.11 1.16 4.8 3.0 1.07 0.84 
USA 1.12 1.19 3.7 2.3 1.28 0.84 
  
 
40 
Table 10. Distortionary Tax Revenues and Social Transfers (%GDP) 
a) Distortionary Tax Revenues 
 1965 1980 1995 2007 
Austria 21.2 26.7 29.6 30.1 
Belgium 19.5 30.0 32.4 32.3 
Denmark 17.8 27.0 33.1 32.5 
Finland 17.3 23.2 31.8 29.9 
France 21.3 30.0 31.2 31.2 
Germany 21.2 27.3 26.8 25.3 
Greece 10.0 13.9 18.6 20.6 
Ireland 11.8 18.0 19.6 22.2 
Italy 15.4 21.8 29.2 30.0 
Netherlands 22.4 31.3 31.3 26.2 
Norway 17.4 27.5 25.2 31.4 
Portugal   8.8 12.6 19.2 21.8 
Spain   8.7 17.9 22.9 27.4 
Sweden 24.1 35.7 34.8 34.6 
Switzerland 11.5 19.5 21.7 22.3 
UK 20.3 24.9 22.7 25.5 
USA 19.1 21.7 22.9 23.2 
b) Social Transfers 
 1960 1980 1995 2007 
Austria 15.9 22.6 26.6 26.4 
Belgium 13.1 23.5 26.4 26.5 
Denmark 12.3 25.2 28.9 26.1 
Finland   8.8 18.4 27.4 24.6 
France 13.4 20.8 28.3 28.4 
Germany 18.1 23.0 26.6 25.2 
Greece 10.4 11.5 19.3 21.3 
Ireland   8.7 17.4 18.4 18.5 
Italy 13.1 18.0 19.8 24.9 
Netherlands 11.7 24.1 22.8 20.1 
Norway   7.8 16.9 23.5 20.8 
Portugal  10.8 18.1 22.5 
Spain  15.5 21.5 21.6 
Sweden 10.8 28.6 32.5 27.3 
Switzerland   4.9 13.9 17.5 18.5 
UK 10.2 16.6 20.4 20.5 
USA   7.3 13.3 15.4 16.2 
Note: distortionary taxes as defined in Kneller et al. (1999) and refer to direct taxes; Ireland 
in 1995 and 2007 as %GNP. 
Sources: Lindert (2004), OECD (2010b) (2011) 
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Table 11. Levels and Rates of Growth of Real GDP per Person and per Hour Worked, 
1995-2007 ($GK1990 and per cent per year) 
a) Real GDP per Person 
 Y/P, 1995 Y/P, 2007 Growth 
Rate, 1995-
2007 
Norway 21578 28553 2.36 
Switzerland 20627 24781 1.55 
Denmark 20350 25060 1.76 
Netherlands 18700 24405 2.24 
Belgium 18270 23487 2.12 
France 18206 22282 1.70 
Austria 17959 23744 2.36 
Germany 17672 21143 1.51 
Sweden 17648 25381 3.07 
UK 17586 23620 2.49 
Italy 17216 20163 1.33 
Finland 15970 24635 3.67 
Spain 13132 17869 2.60 
Ireland 12734 23338 5.18 
Portugal 11614 14601 1.93 
Greece 10321 15860 3.64 
 
b) Real GDP per Hour Worked 
 Y/HW, 
1995 
Y/HW, 
2007 
Growth 
Rate, 
1995-2007 
Belgium 30.37 35.74 1.37 
Norway 29.82 36.72 1.69 
France 29.02 35.44 1.69 
Netherlands 27.75 33.84 1.67 
Denmark 26.98 30.52 1.03 
Germany 25.10 30.78 1.72 
UK 24.33 31.65 2.22 
Italy 24.29 25.63 0.46 
Austria 23.50 28.68 1.68 
Sweden 23.13 31.32 2.56 
Finland 22.36 30.42 2.60 
Spain 22.21 23.43 0.64 
Switzerland 21.92 25.82 1.38 
Ireland 17.21 26.01 3.50 
Portugal 13.60 15.62 1.16 
Greece 11.63 16.78 3.10 
Note: Ireland is GNP 
Source: The Conference Board (2011) 
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Table 12. Investment in Intangibles in the Market Sector, 2006 (%GDP) 
 Computerized 
Information 
Innovative 
Property 
Economic 
Competencies 
Total 
 I f r ti  r rt  t i s  
Austria 0.89 3.14 2.42 6.46 
Czech Republic 0.71 2.80 2.93 6.45 
Denmark 1.87 3.06 2.93 7.86 
France 1.42 3.18 3.30 7.90 
Germany 0.73 3.59 2.84 7.16 
Greece 0.34 0.62 0.63 1.59 
Italy 0.64 2.21 2.19 5.04 
Slovakia 0.37 1.76 2.39 4.53 
Spain 0.79 2.78 1.90 5.47 
UK 1.55 3.16 5.84 10.54 
USA 1.61 4.37 5.50 11.48 
 
Source: van Ark et al. (2009) 
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Table 13. Market Sector Growth Accounting with Intangibles, 1995-2006 (% per year) 
 ICT K/L Non-ICT 
K/L 
Intangible 
K/L 
Labour TFP Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
  /  /  Quality  r ti it  
Austria 0.26 -0.02 0.55 0.22 1.35 2.36 
Czech R 0.35 1.62 0.68 0.31 1.64 4.60 
Denmark 0.44 0.24 0.72 0.17 0.53 2.11 
France 0.12 0.31 0.48 0.40 0.69 2.00 
Germany 0.20 0.48 0.38 -0.15 0.88 1.79 
Greece 0.45 1.48 0.24 0.71 0.40 3.27 
Italy 0.11 0.29 0.12 0.22 -0.45 0.29 
Slovakia  2.72 0.21 0.46 2.78 6.17 
Spain 0.19 0.49 0.12 0.64 -0.96 0.47 
UK 0.63 0.28 0.69 0.22 1.23 3.06 
USA 0.40 0.24 0.83 0.18 1.33 2.96 
 
Note: intangibles investments are part of final output and ICT K included with non-ICT K in 
Slovakia 
Source: van Ark et al. (2009) 
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Table 14. Governance Indicators (-2.5 to 2.5) 
a) 1996 
 Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory  
Quality 
Control of 
 Corruption 
Rule of Law 
 ff ti ss  lit  rr ti   
Austria 1.984 1.154 2.120 1.841 
Belgium 1.935 0.971 1.350 1.406 
Denmark 2.027 1.213 2.222 1.828 
Finland 2.114 1.089 2.221 1.914 
France 1.755 0.766 1.353 1.520 
Germany 2.006 1.072 2.134 1.633 
Greece 0.836 0.746 0.511 1.098 
Ireland 1.732 1.224 1.486 1.589 
Italy 0.919 0.649 0.505 1.050 
Netherlands 2.056 1.285 2.178 1.734 
Norway 2.064 1.063 2.216 1.928 
Portugal 0.999 1.028 2.015 1.276 
Spain 1.570 0.878 1.248 1.354 
Sweden 2.010 1.075 2.203 1.763 
Switzerland 2.146 1.082 2.166 1.946 
UK 1.884 1.469 2.171 1.662 
b) 2007 
 Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Control of 
Corruption 
Rule of Law 
 ff ti ss lit  rr ti   
Austria 1.776 1.649 2.049 1.928 
Belgium 1.502 1.365 1.303 1.297 
Denmark 2.235 1.855 2.426 1.964 
Finland 1.907 1.511 2.408 1.861 
France 1.433 1.255 1.433 1.378 
Germany 1.606 1.549 1.698 1.698 
Greece 0.661 0.850 0.319 0.798 
Ireland 1.614 1.780 1.727 1.735 
Italy 0.333 0.869 0.270 0.403 
Netherlands 1.708 1.735 2.159 1.738 
Norway 1.978 1.331 1.925 1.905 
Portugal 0.902 1.084 0.990 1.007 
Spain 0.960 1.186 1.008 1.083 
Sweden 1.942 1.569 2.206 1.855 
Switzerland 1.966 1.620 2.134 1.816 
UK 1.622 1.801 1.716 1.658 
Note: indicators are normalized such that the median = 0 in each year and so are not strictly 
comparable over time 
Source: World Bank. Governance matters indicators 
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Table 15. Doing Business Indicators: Time needed to complete procedures  
DB 2008 (1) 
Country 
Starting a 
Business 
Dealing 
with 
Licenses 
Registering 
Property 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Time 
(days) 
Time 
(days) 
Time 
(days) 
Time 
(days) 
Austria 28 194 32 397 
Belgium 4 169 132 505 
Denmark 6 69 42 380 
Finland 14 66 14 235 
France 7 137 123 331 
Germany 18 100 40 394 
Greece 38 169 22 819 
Ireland 13 209 38 515 
Italy (Rome) 13 257 27 1210 
Netherlands 8 230 7 514 
Norway 7 252 3 310 
Portugal 7 327 42 577 
Spain 47 233 18 515 
Sweden 15 116 15 508 
Switzerland 20 154 16 417 
UK 13 144 21 404 
     
     
DB Italy (2008) (2) 
Area  
Starting a 
Business 
Dealing 
with 
Licenses 
Registering 
Property 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Time 
(days) 
Time 
(days) 
Time 
(days) 
Time 
(days) 
Italy NW 13,2 414,8 10,6 1826 
Italy NE 13,3 442,3 10,4 1866 
Italy Centre 12,1 355,5 11,2 2095 
Italy South & 
Islands 
25,3 585,0 12,2 2140 
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(1) Source : World Bank Doing Business ( (2) Source: Bianco, e Bripi, F., “Administrative 
Burdens on Business Activities: Regional Disparities”, Giornale degli Economisti, Vo. 69, 
num. 2 (Luglio 2010) pp. 37-79.Weighted averages of regional values in the area  (using  
regional GDP  as weights) 
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Fig.1 
 
Source: Balassone, Francese and Pace (2010) 
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Fig.2 
 
Source: Banca d‟Italia (2000) 
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